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STATE BUILDING, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMOCRACY: 
THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 
 
 
Introduction  
The remolding of the state from an autocratic to a democratic one in postwar Japan is sometimes 
regarded as a successful case of external intervention for state-building. 
When Americans landed in Japan two weeks after Japan’s acceptance of unconditional surrender, they 
expected to meet a fanatic and intransigent people. Instead they were surprised by the orderly and 
peaceful behavior of Japanese soldiers and citizens (Tamaki 2005, 13-20). Disarmament, 
demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (into their home towns/villages) of millions of soldiers 
proceeded surprisingly smooth between 1945 and 1948 (Gordon 2003, 229-30; Hando 2006, 14-15). 
The authoritarian state gave way to a democratic one within two years of the beginning of the 
American occupation and democracy has persisted since1. And finally, the Japanese economy had 
already begun to experience high growth when the occupation ended in April 1952. In every respect, 
American occupation policies seem to have been successful. 
Against this image of the American occupation in Japan, this paper will argue that American policies 
were only partially helpful in the democratic remolding and economic development of postwar Japan. 
The prewar political and economic experiences of the Japanese themselves, and the psychological 
impact of the defeat, played equally important roles in the democratic rebirth of the Japanese state. 
Those in search of solutions to the development challenges facing fragile countries today should 
understand that Japan’s “success” did not begin in 1945 and was not the result of a peace settlement 
quickly followed by new institutions. The ground work for Japanese success was 80-90 years in the 
making. Analysis of state-building, economic development, and democracy in Japan must start from 
the Meiji Restoration of 1868. 
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 The first House of Representatives election under the new democratic Constitution was held in April 1947, twenty months 
after the surrender. 
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1. Building a modern state in the Imperialist Era 
Japan already had a long history of democratization efforts before the war. These started in 
conjunction with attempts at building a modern state and were closely related to transformation of the 
national economy. 
When the feudal rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown in 1868 by rebel forces in the name 
of the Emperor, the political and economic situation in Japan was extremely fragile. In many of the fiefs 
ruled by feudal lords, especially in western Japan, the traditional hierarchical order was crumbling as 
the anti-Tokugawa movement was led mostly by lower-class samurai. In the atmosphere of a general 
loosening of discipline, numerous uprisings by peasants and urban masses shook all parts of the 
country. This social disorder, together with violent clashes between Tokugawa and anti-Tokugawa 
forces, jeopardized productive and commercial activities, further debilitating a national economy 
which faced ballooning national and foreign debt accumulated by both the Tokugawa Shogunate and 
the anti-Tokugawa forces. 
In addition to these difficulties, between 1854 and 1859 unequal treaties had been imposed on Japan 
by the Western imperialist powers. Japan was denied the autonomy to decide the level of import 
tariffs and foreigners living in settlements were outside of the jurisdiction of Japanese courts. Japan 
had become virtually a semi-independent country. 
The government newly established in 1868 faced multiple difficulties as it attempted to build a modern 
state and to regain complete independence through successful renegotiation of the unequal treaties. 
First it had to establish a national army and a centralized administrative system in a country still ruled 
by approximately 300 feudal lords. 
For the purpose of centralization of military forces and administrative structures, during the first six 
years (1868-73) the government implemented a series of administrative reforms. Functionally diverse 
ministries (such as Finance, Foreign Affairs, Military, Justice, Education, Industry, and Home Affairs) 
were established2; the fiefs were abolished and integrated into a smaller number of prefectures; 
former feudal lords were appointed as governors; and centralized military forces composed of former 
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 It was, however, as late as 1887 before a professional bureaucracy based on meritocratic examinations replaced the 
politically appointed officials who filled government offices (Gordon 2003, 64). 
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samurai were established to defend the capital as well as the country’s four regions3. Government 
leaders believed, however, that a broadly based army would be necessary to face external threats and 
it decided to introduce a universal conscription system in 1873 despite the measure’s threat to the 
privileged position of the former samurai class (Banno 2007, 90-104; Gordon 2003, 66)4. 
All these tasks of centralization aggravated the fiscal burdens of the central government. It had to 
assume the feudal lords’ role of paying salaries to the former samurai who now served as 
administrators or military servicemen in the central and prefectural governments. It also had to 
establish educational and infrastructural bases for economic development5. It even played an 
entrepreneurial role since investors were hesitant under the highly uncertain conditions. The economic 
development of the nation was regarded as crucial to strengthen the military capability to survive the 
imperialist age as an independent country. 
To strengthen its fiscal base, in 1873 the government centralized and standardized the tax on 
agricultural lands. At that time, income and corporate taxes did not yet exist and revenues from import 
tariffs were severely limited by the unequal treaties. In 1875, the land tax and import tariffs accounted 
for 85.0% and 2.9% of all tax revenues, respectively, as shown in Table 1 below. Since this reform 
meant a tax increase, peasant protests and rebellions spread throughout the county. 
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 Samurai also made up a 2000-strong police force formed in 1871 to protect the capital city. In 1874, this police force 
developed into the Metropolitan Police Department under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The police force 
expanded after the 1877 civil war and assumed some of the internal-security responsibilities of the military (Katzenstein & 
Tsujinaka 1991, 35-36). 
4
 The former samurai class numbered 1.8 million, or 5.5% of the total population of 33 million, in 1872 (Ando 1975, Table 
1.51). 
5
 Obligatory primary education (four years) was institutionalized in 1872. In the same year, the first railroad was constructed 
between Tokyo and Yokohama. 
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Table 1 Share of Tax Revenues (%) 
Tax on 1875 1890 1905 1920 1935 
Agricultural Land 85.0  60.7  32.0  10.1  6.3  
Income - 1.7  6.2  8.5  14.4  
Corporate Income - - 3.1  17.5  10.1  
Business Activity - - 7.5  8.5  5.9  
Alcoholic Beverages 4.4  21.0  23.5  22.4  22.6  
Sugar - - 4.5  5.5  9.2  
Imports  2.9  6.7  14.6  9.5  16.3  
Source: Ando 1975, Table 26. 
 
This rural discontent coincided with a growing dissatisfaction among the former samurai who had 
failed to gain high positions in the new government and were experiencing a general decline in social 
and economic status. Their discontent exploded in 1876 when the government finally decided to 
terminate their monthly stipend and to make them a one-time transfer of interest bearing national 
bonds in amounts dependent on their rank. While a privileged minority of high-ranking samurai 
received bonds valuable enough to be used for investment purposes, most faced a huge decline in 
income and a complete loss of privilege. A series of violent rebellions occurred, culminating in the 
fierce February-September 1877 civil war led by Saigo, one of the most famous anti-Tokugawa leaders 
(Banno 2007, 173-75)6. 
To mitigate the general social unrest, the government reduced the land tax by 16.7% in early 1877. To 
suppress the armed rebellions, however, it did not hesitate to use coercive power. The problem for the 
government was that it was not a united entity but was composed of an assortment of anti-Tokugawa 
leaders who had diverse visions for the future (Banno 2001, Chapter 1). One of the biggest differences 
was which of the two purposes, external military expansion or domestic economic development, 
should be given priority in government policy. Saigo promoted the military option and exited the 
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government when he was defeated by others who prioritized industrial promotion to strengthen the 
national economy. 
Another dimension of intra-leadership contention was the timing of the establishment of a publicly 
elected parliament and the kind of authority to be given to parliamentarians. Some leaders wanted to 
see a national parliament with power sufficient to control the government. Others hoped to delay the 
establishment of a parliament and to restrict its authority through prerogatives of the Emperor. By the 
beginning of the 1880s, the former had lost out to the latter (Banno 2007, 223-228). 
For two reasons, however, the government could not totally neglect the demand to open a parliament. 
First, it had to demonstrate to the Western powers that Japan was a civilized country. The adoption of 
a modern constitution and a parliamentary system were regarded as necessary conditions for a 
successful renegotiation of the unequal treaties. Second, coercion alone was considered to be 
unproductive for reducing resistance to government policies. It was thought that the establishment of 
a parliament would dampen the anti-government fervor and weaken those who would opt for armed 
resistance. 
A deadlock faced by the industrial-promotion policy further impelled the government to make 
concessions to its opponents. This difficulty stemmed from the huge fiscal deficit caused by the civil 
war of 1877 and resultant macro-economic instability. Expansionary economic policy gave way to 
highly austere policy, including increases in the municipality land tax and the rice-wine (sake) tax. The 
government was forced also to privatize publicly run factories and mines. Thereafter, the fate of the 
national economy largely depended on private initiatives. To counter the mounting criticism of these 
policies, in October 1881 the government issued the Imperial Ordinance for the Establishment of Diet 
by which the government promised to enact a constitution and organize general elections within nine 
years (Banno 2007: 216-23 & 238-39). 
Both violent and peaceful anti-government protests persisted during the 1880s but they did not 
prevent the government from enacting and promulgating a constitution in February 1889. To the 
detriment of the opposition forces, the Constitution gave only limited authority to the Diet while 
granting to the Emperor power to control the military and the government. The first general election of 
July 1890, however, brought the joyful result to the opposition of giving them a parliamentary majority 
(Gordon 2003, 127). 
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The majority of the parliamentarians, now organized into political parties, were important farmers and 
local gentry because suffrage was determined by the amount of taxes paid. At the time of the first 
general election, the qualified electorate constituted only 1% of the total population (Gordon 2003, 
126-27). In this respect, the new Diet was an elitist institution. However, it counterbalanced the 
authoritarian government by frequently rejecting its budget proposals and calling for accountability to 
tax payers. Although the share of the land tax was declining rapidly, the share of rice-wine tax jumped 
to exceed 20% of the total by 1890 (see Table 1). Rice wine was produced by small and medium-sized 
breweries run by the local gentry. 
Facing intransigence in Diet on the part of political parties, more moderate leaders in the government 
headed by Hirobumi Ito decided to work with them instead of fighting against them (Gordon 2003, 
128); more conservative leaders in the government, however, continued to reject the parties. 
In short, the effort to build a modern state equipped with centralized state machinery and a growing 
economy required policies that effectively sacrificed former samurai and peasants. These people, 
however, did not accept their fate without resistance. In order to co-opt some of these anti-
governmental forces and ease their resistance, the Meiji government implemented partial 
democratization by introducing a parliamentary system and elections; this, in turn, opened the way to 
further democratization during the decades that followed. 
 
2. Why did the prewar attempt at building a democratic state fail? 
The period between 1905 and 1932 is known as the era of democratic upsurge in prewar Japan. In 
September 1905, mobs, composed mostly of urban laborers of various kinds, rioted against the 
government and burned police stations/boxes, the residence of the Minister of Home Affairs, and a 
pro-government newspaper company in central Tokyo. Riots spread into many parts of Japan and the 
government was forced to declare Tokyo under martial law to put them down (Narita 2007, 2-7). 
The reason for the rebellion was that the government had accepted the US-mediated peace agreement 
that put an end to the Russo-Japanese war. The agreement did not include an indemnity payment by 
defeated Russia, which many Japanese believed Japan was entitled to as many citizens lost family 
members and bore heavy tax burdens to support the fierce conflict. Political parties and their rich 
supporters did not like the mob violence, but they could live with it as long as people’s discontent was 
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directed toward the conservative government leaders who continued to impose heavy taxes but 
oppose the realization of a representative government. 
When the Russo-Japanese War started in 1904, the Japanese economy had been undergoing rapid 
transformation. As Table 2 demonstrates, the pace of industrialization quickened during the 1890s, led 
by the cotton spinning sector. The import of cotton yarns was surpassed by domestic production in 
1891 and by yarn exports in 1897 (Ando 1975, Table 3.47). Heavy industry and chemical industries 
started to expand in the early 20th Century. The ratio of the domestic production of steel to the 
domestic consumption increased from 13.4% in 1900/04 to 96.7% in 1930/34 (Ando 1975, Table 5.69). 
Even machine industry grew to occupy 20% of all manufacturing production in 1939, although the main 
export products continued to be textiles (silk/cotton yarns and fabrics) during the prewar period (Ando 
1975, Table 5.71; Yano Tsuneta Kinenkai 2006, Table 8.4).  
 
 Table 2  Growth Rate by Sectors (%) 
  Primary Sector Secondary Sector 
1880/90 23.6  47.5  
1890/00 8.7  60.0  
1900/10 14.4  43.8  
1910/20 31.4  90.3  
1920/30 10.7  60.2  
 Source: Calculated from Ando 1975, Table 1. 
 
As a result of the rapid industrialization, there was a notable change in the tax structure. In 1905, as 
shown in Table 1, the land tax accounted for only 36%, down from 85% recorded in 1875, while income 
tax (both individual and corporate) and business tax (which had been zero in 1875) came to account for 
as much as 17%. In the process, the number of people in the commercial and industrial sectors subject 
to taxation expanded. They shared an opposition to their tax burdens with land owners and local 
gentry and participated in party politics. 
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Amidst another nation-wide riot, this time protesting a sharp rise in the price of rice, the first ever 
cabinet organized by the majority party and composed mostly of party politicians was allowed to form 
in 1918. The party cabinet continued in existence until 1932, except for the period 1922-1924. 
Universal male suffrage was introduced by one of these party governments in 1925, expanding the 
electorate to 20% of the population. Although radical leftist parties were banned by the Internal 
Security Law, the practice of two political parties competing against each other in free elections was 
established (Narita 2007, 82-93 & 190-198). Through this process, adult males could accumulate 
experience in participating in competitive elections. 
The practice of democracy, however, did not last long. In the face of social and political unrest caused 
by the Great Depression, the Manchurian incident, and terrorist violence by extreme rightists, in 1932 
political parties handed the cabinet over to conservative leaders supported by bureaucrats and the 
military. Although parties continued to compete in elections until 1937, they never regained 
government power. 
A main reason for the failure of the political party system, and consequently of the prewar democracy 
was the fact that the demand for democracy had been almost always accompanied by a nationalist and 
imperialist fervor. 
For example, opposition movements during the 1880s were able to survive government repression and 
reactivate themselves thanks to a perception of moral weakness in the government’s posture in 
renegotiating the unequal treaties. The opposition accused the government of offering “excessive” 
concessions to the Western powers in exchange for their abandonment of extraterritorial rights 
(Gordon 2003, 91). The riot of 1905 mentioned above, which the opposition forces took advantage of 
to criticize the government, was motivated also by nationalist indignation against perceived 
fainthearted government diplomacy. The political parties and the general electorate supported 
arduously the wars against China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905), although they were not happy 
with the related tax burdens. Most of them also supported Japan’s imperialist expansion into the 
Korean Peninsula and China. 
Similarly, whenever they could, the authoritarian leaders took advantage of wars and imperialist 
expansion to bolster support among the population and to secure consent from the party-dominant 
Diet. Thanks to the early timing of its state building, Japan was probably the last country among the 
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non-Western late modernizers able to take advantage of imperialist policies to mitigate the domestic 
socio-political tensions accompanying the state building and economic development processes. 
The connection between democracy and imperialism led to an unhappy result for the former. When 
the military embarked on adventurous actions abroad, stirred up nationalist or even xenophobic 
sentiment, and aroused a sense of national crisis, political parties and the electorate could not resist 
and were absorbed into the fervent ultranationalist wave. Agricultural landowners and 
industrial/commercial entrepreneurs joined the wave of support for the ultimately devastating war, 
against first China (1937) and then the United States (1941). 
In spite of its unhappy end, prewar democracy had once flourished by driving a wedge into the 
authoritarian Emperor regime. If the ultranationalist option had not been available for Japan, political 
parties and the military/bureaucratic elite might have sought the path of further compromise, 
eventually strengthening democratic institutions and practices. The unconditional surrender of Japan 
in 1945 brought the sudden emergence of this kind of situation. 
 
3. Conditions that facilitated the democratic rebirth of the state in postwar Japan 
In the months following the end of the war, Japan faced again a highly fragile situation. The war-torn 
economy had collapsed due to the curtailment of imports, and it could not feed a population which 
was being joined by millions of civilians and soldiers repatriated from various parts of East Asia. 
Hundreds starved to death in Tokyo alone. People were constantly hungry and crime was rampant. 
Many observers described social condition at that time in terms such as despondency, psychological 
shock stemming from the defeat and foreign military occupation, despair at the difficulties of everyday 
life, and absence of vision for the future (Dower 1999, 89; Gordon 2003, 229). Japan was only able to 
survive these difficult years thanks to the aid provided by the United States. Between September 1945 
and December 1949, 66% of all imports to Japan were covered by American aid (Ando 1975, Table 
7.22). 
Notwithstanding the general state of lethargy, political, bureaucratic and economic elites (excluding 
military leaders who had lost prestige and trust) were determined to maintain as many elements of the 
ancient regime as possible, including the Emperor’s sovereignty. For example, Shigeru Yoshida, who 
served as Prime Minister five times between 1946 and 1954 and is regarded as the central figure in the 
10 
reconstruction of the postwar state, held the optimistic view that Japan would eventually return to its 
pre-militarist age (Dower 1979, 277; Kouno 2002, 26)7. 
General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to use the existing administrative structures (except for the 
military and the Ministry of Home Affairs) and their personnel to govern Japan also heightened the 
pre-war elites’ expectations for retention of the ancient regime. If they had been successful in their 
restoration attempt, the postwar regime would have been one in which a representative government 
controlled by elected political parties ruled under sovereignty of the Emperor, suppressing leftist 
political parties, workers’ and sharecroppers’ movements, and radical mass media. Under this regime, 
Japan would have been a semi-democratic state, more democratic than contemporary China or 
Singapore but as democratic as Malaysia. 
To the disappointment of these elites, the GHQ (General Headquarters) of the occupation forces 
launched a series of democratization reforms after October 1945: The Internal Security Law was 
abolished and mass media and social and political organizations were given full freedom; leaders who 
were regarded as responsible for the war were expelled from the bureaucracy, political parties, and 
mass organizations8; land reform was ordered; and big business conglomerates named zaibatsu were 
forceably dissolved. The combined result of all these reforms was a sharp decline in the power of the 
prewar elite and an equally rapid rise in leftist political parties and labor movements (Bisson 2005, 44-
45). In addition, and under strong pressure from the GHQ, by October 1946 Shigero Yoshida’s 
government and the Diet had adopted a new constitution which transferred sovereignty to the people 
while reducing the Emperor to only a symbol of the nation. Furthermore, the Constitution’s famous 
Article 9 prohibited the exercise of military power or the threat thereof as a means to solve 
international disputes (Section 1), renounced military force, and relinquished the right to engage in 
warfare (Section 2). 
Although the GHQ’s eagerness for democratic reforms waned as the Cold War set in, as long as 
American rule continued, the old elites could never hope to restore the ancient regime. Their chance 
finally came in April 1952 when Japan recovered its independence. In an opinion survey conducted by 
Yomiuri Newspaper on April 16, 1952, 42% of the respondents endorsed the necessity of constitutional 
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revision while only 17% opposed it9. In the same survey, 48% agreed that Article 9 should be revised 
while 39% disagreed. An opinion poll by Mainichi Newspaper (April 14, 1952) revealed a similar 
pattern, with 43.2% endorsing revision of Article 9 while 26.8% opposed it10. 
During the immediate post-independence years, nationalist feelings were on the rise among the 
population in general and among conservative leaders in particular, critical of Yoshida for his allegedly 
U.S.-dependent stance. These conservative leaders demanded Japan’s heavy rearmament as a means 
to free the nation from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1951 which they regarded as an unequal 
treaty. 
Nationalist conservatives sought revision of the Constitution since they considered Article 9 to be a 
serious obstacle to full-scale rearmament. They also wanted to recover some of the Emperor’s prewar 
prerogatives (Watanabe 2005, 14-16). The conservative movement culminated in the establishment of 
the Commission on the Constitution, first in 1954 in the ruling Liberal Party and two years later in the 
Diet (Ruoff 2003, 74-77).  
The conservatives’ attempt, however, never succeeded. The electorate refused to give a two thirds 
majority of the Diet (necessary for a constitutional revision) to the conservative parties in the general 
elections of 1955 and 195811. By that time, the postwar democratic state had become firmly 
established. Under the “Peace Constitution,” the capability of the Self Defense Forces, which is a de 
facto military established in 1954, continued to be highly restricted while the Emperor did not regain 
sovereignty. 
There are many reasons, both endogenous and exogenous, why the restoration of the authoritarian 
state failed in postwar Japan. 
The first endogenous reason is the irreversible impact of the defeat in war on the mindset of the 
Japanese people. The despair they felt immediately after the surrender soon changed into deeply 
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99). According to an opinion survey conducted in 1955, 31% of the respondents recalled that they had felt happy when the 
postwar Constitution was enacted. As many as 28%, however, answered that they had been indifferent (Cabinet Office 1955). 
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angry conviction that they had been deceived and victimized by their wartime leaders, especially the 
military. In addition, their devastating experiences during the war had strengthened their anti-war 
feeling. “No more war” was now like a religious belief for many people. Due to this deep popular 
aversion to the war and the military, heavy-rearmament with an inevitable increase in the military’s 
influence could not muster public opinion. 
The defeat also destroyed the myth held by the people of a sovereign emperor, although it did not lead 
so far as to rejection of the emperor system itself. On the one hand, hundreds of thousand people who 
gathered at the plaza outside of the Imperial Palace on the first postwar May Day of 1946 shouted in 
denunciation of the Emperor and demanded that the emperor system be dismantled. On the other 
hand, in a poll taken in the early days of 1946, more than 90% expressed support for the system (Hara 
2008, 154-55). This overwhelming support for the emperor system was confirmed in an opinion survey 
conducted after the recovery of independence: 82% of the respondents supported it (Cabinet Office 
1956). In that same survey, however, 48% endorsed a “symbolic” emperor, exceeding the number 
(23%) who believed that the Emperor should be granted genuine authority. The corresponding figures 
in 1958 were 50% vs. 33% and in 1960 54% vs. 23% (Cabinet Office 1958 & 1960). It is clear that the 
Japanese citizens who had been loyal subjects of the sovereign Emperor before the war continued to 
support the emperor system, but as a mere symbol, no longer as a sovereign. 
People’s attitudes toward democracy also appeared to have undergone a major transformation. 
Writing about the mood among the people in 1945 and 1946, John Dower (1999, 67) observed 
seemingly ardent support for democracy as “a gift from heaven.” This was again a reaction to the 
devastating and disastrous experiences of war and surrender that presumably had been caused by the 
military-led totalitarian regime. We need to recall, however, that this was not the first experience with 
democracy for Japanese citizens. They had participated in competitive politics at least until 1932 and 
could compare them with the hardship of wartime. 
The prewar and postwar democracies differed in that political freedom was extended to leftist parties 
and labor unions after the war and a representative government was now constitutionally guaranteed. 
The public did not like labor strikes and demonstrations, and they were also discontent with the 
conduct of elected officials, but they overwhelmingly and consistently supported electoral politics and 
rejected the use of violence as a means to improve social conditions (Cabinet Office 1954, 1955 
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&1956). This attitude on the part of the people must have stemmed from their unhappy memory of 
the authoritarian interlude between the prewar and postwar democracies. 
Japan’s complete defeat in the war also profoundly affected the regional power structure in Asia. The 
military capability of Japan was largely curtailed by the occupation forces, while China emerged as an 
influential country and Korea and some Southeast Asian countries gained independence. Militarily 
expansionary policy abroad would have been extremely difficult and costly, even if Japan had 
succeeded in heavy rearmament. 
In short, all these changes rooted in Japan’s unconditional surrender made a marriage between 
democracy and imperialism impossible. Any political force that came to hold governmental power had 
to cope with domestic opposition without resorting to nationalist expansionism. Peaceful competition 
and consensus-building were the sole means available. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the endogenous transformations described above, the reforms 
introduced by the occupation forces were not meaningless. On the contrary, they were highly 
instrumental in anchoring democracy-fostering transformations firmly to the ground. Especially 
important in this regard were labor relations and land reform in agriculture. 
In 1940, landless sharecroppers occupied 26.8% of all rural households. Among the land-owning 
farmers, 75.6% held less than one hectare each while 0.5% owned more than 10 hectares. Thanks to 
full-fledged land reform under the GHQ, the share of landless sharecroppers went down to 5.1% of all 
households while independent farmers increased from 31.1% to 61.9% between 1940 and 1950 (Ando 
1975, Table 18 and Table 21). In five years, Japanese rural society was transformed into a domain 
wholly dominated by small independent farmers. These farmers were divided politically. The majority 
supported conservative parties but a significant number of farmers voted for the Socialist Party 
because some of the socialist leaders had worked to organize the sharecroppers’ movement. 
Reforms in labor relations were as profound as the land reform. Workers were granted legal rights to 
freely organize unions, negotiate contracts with their employers, and engage in strikes. Although in 
July 1948 the GHQ imposed a law banning civil servants’ strikes, workers’ space for free activities was 
enhanced significantly. As a result, the unionization rate, which had been only 3.2% in 1945, shot up to 
14 
41.5% in 1946 and reached 55.8% in 195012. Several peak associations of labor unions were organized 
and re-organized between 1946 and 1955 and they supported the Social Party or the Communist Party. 
The relative power of labor was strengthened by another GHQ reform which forced the dismantling of 
large business conglomerates. Labor unions, together with some of the independent farmers and the 
leftist parties, now emerged as powerful counterbalances to conservative forces (Montgomery 1957, 
173). They were so powerful that it would have been extremely costly for the conservatives to 
abrogate these postwar reforms and restore the old authoritarian regime. Leftist forces, for their part, 
needed to work within the institutional democratic framework since few people supported violent 
methods. The politics of compromise was necessary for everybody. The pro-democracy tendency of 
the population nurtured as a reaction to the war and surrender was thus reinforced and locked in by 
externally imposed reforms13. 
The final touch in the consolidation of the democratic state in postwar Japan was provided by the high 
economic growth recorded after 1951. Production in the primary and secondary sectors returned to 
the prewar (1940) level in 1952 and 1955 respectively (Ando 1975, Table 1). The annual GDP growth 
rates were 8.9% in 1956-60, 9.0% in 1961-65, and 10.9% in 1966-70. The share of the manufacturing 
sector in GDP expanded from 28.4% in 1955 to 33.7% in 1965 while the share of the primary sector 
declined from 19.9% to 9.8% during the same period (Yano Tsuneta Kinenkai 2006, Table 3.3 & Table 
3.13). Japan transformed itself into an affluent nation. 
Through detailed quantitative analysis, Przeworski and his associates found that while high national 
income does not necessarily help transform an authoritarian regime into a democratic one, it 
contributes significantly to the maintenance of a democratic regime already in place. No democratic 
country whose GDP per capita is above $6,055 (1985 PPP) has ever experienced a breakdown of 
regime (Przeworski et al. 2000, 94 & 98). The Japanese economy attained that level in 1968. 
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 The unionization rate went down subsequently to 35.6% in 1955 and less than 20% today (Ando 1975, Table 7.36; Yano 
Tsuneka Kinenkai 2006, Table 2.38). 
13
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depriving the Self Defense Forces, now deeply dependent on American training and equipment, of operational autonomy 
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Treaty is sometimes called a “cap on the bottle” (Pyle 1998, 133). 
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The high economic growth certainly helped the consolidation of the democratic state in postwar Japan. 
However, the analysis presented above shows that the postwar democracy was already firmly 
established by the early 1950s (much before 1968), a time when the Japanese economy had barely 
recovered to its prewar level. No one can say with certainty whether democracy would have survived 
in Japan if its economy had grown more slowly; but judging from the profound changes in people’s 
mindset and the equally profound reforms under the occupation forces, this author believes that the 
odds favored democracy’s endurance even under a stagnant economy. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Japan’s postwar economic growth was never a miracle born out of 
the ashes of war. By the time the war began, the Japanese economy had developed to the level of 
producing heavy machinery such as vehicles, airplanes and warships, although its most internationally 
competitive exports were still mostly textiles. Many factories and skilled workers were lost in the war, 
but accumulated technical knowledge was there to support a historical second economic take-off, 
though admittedly this was helped greatly by American procurement for the Korean War of 1950-53. 
Both democracy and economic development in postwar Japan were built on prewar achievements. 
 
Conclusion 
It is incorrect to maintain that the postwar Japanese democracy was brought about by the American 
occupation forces. Democratic state-building and the spectacular economic success of Japan after 1945 
both have deep roots in the country’s prewar experiences with state-building, economic development, 
and democratization as well as in the equally profound transformation of people’s values generated by 
the devastating experience of war and defeat. U.S. occupation policies only helped to reinforce an 
endogenous trend of democratic resurgence and economic recovery14. Externally imposed reforms and 
externally provided resources alone could never have created such a stable and prosperous democratic 
state in such a short period of time. 
To draw general lessons from the Japanese experience is not an easy task. After all, Japan began its 
efforts at state-building and economic development one century before the developing countries of 
today. Nonetheless, in view of the highly fragile situation in which Japan started its modernization in 
                                                          
14
 Masanori Nakamura (1994, 74) came to the same conclusion although he emphasizes the conflict and conciliation between 
conservatives and progressives during the occupation. 
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1868 and its reconstruction in 1945, there are certainly some lessons to be shared with equally fragile 
countries of today. 
First, state building in Japan included two basic elements: construction of the machinery of state and 
establishment of stable state-society relations. Both processes were mostly autonomous endeavors 
pursued by the Japanese themselves. The maintenance of internal order, the implementation of GHQ-
ordered reforms, and the quick economic recovery planning during the early postwar years were made 
possible only by the efficient police and civil bureaucracy which had been organized and 
professionalized in the prewar process of state-building. 
The GHQ policy of using existing state institutions posed some risk of “spoiling” democratic reforms. 
GHQ’s resolve to remold Japan was as strong, however, as the Japanese citizens’ aversion to their 
authoritarian past. Both obstructed attempts by conservatives to restore the ancient regime. The old 
bureaucratic structures survived and supported a relatively smooth reconstruction of the country while 
avoiding restoration of an authoritarian order. 
The construction of stable state-society relations was again an autonomous Japanese process helped 
by occupation policies. As analyzed in the first and second parts of this paper, the prewar democracy 
grew out of long-running conflict and conciliation between the state (the Meiji leaders) and the society 
(opposition forces). After WWII, conservative leaders such as Shigeru Yoshida did not attempt to 
rebuild an autocratic state; rather, they worked for the restoration of the semi-democratic prewar 
regime in which the government was publicly elected and accepted by society although political 
freedom was restricted. In practice, the democracy that took root in postwar Japan was a more 
genuine one, but this came about only through sometimes conflicting interactions between traditional 
elites and the leftist/liberal opposition. The latter were helped by the general public’s inclination 
toward anti-military, democratic practices and by GHQ-led social and political reforms. 
In short, the Japanese experience demonstrates that “ownership” is important for the formation of an 
efficient and democratically legitimate state but the process is rocky and long. 
The second lesson to be drawn from the Japanese experience concerns the role in the state-building 
process that can be played by external forces. The United States contributed to the democratic rebirth 
of the Japanese state in three ways. First, the U.S. defeated Japan’s imperial military and autocratic 
regime, leading to a transformation of traditional values and changes in East Asia’s international power 
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structure. Second, U.S. occupation forces realized a series of reforms that contributed to a 
transformation in internal power relations among socio-political forces, thus helping anti-elite forces. 
Third, the U.S. provided enormous amounts of material aid to assist the devastated economy, which 
helped consolidate the democratic state. 
The important role played by the U.S. notwithstanding, external intervention was effective in durable 
state-building only because such endogenous conditions as bureaucratic efficiency, experience with 
democratic practices, and anti-elite sentiment were already in place. In addition, the effectiveness of 
the U.S. intervention was based on the totality of its victory in the war. The mindset of the Japanese 
people was deeply transformed by the country’s unconditional surrender after so much sacrifice and 
suffering. Furthermore, the conservatives could not prevent enactment of the new constitution and 
other pro-democracy reforms because the GHQ had established complete authority over the state. To 
achieve this level of victory, the United States, itself, paid a high price, losing hundreds of thousand 
lives of their own in the war. 
In the contemporary world where “new war” is the dominant form of armed strife (Kaldor 1999) and 
public opinion at home is highly sensitive to loss of life, this kind of total victory can seldom be 
achieved. Armed groups in the target country are not easily demoralized and political forces are not 
sufficiently responsive to external demand for quick reforms. External actors who intervene in fragile 
countries today must accept the reality that their success in remolding them will be limited unless they 
are ready to fight for a total victory. It is important to remember that successful state formation is 
realized only through a lengthy process of conflict and conciliation among local stakeholders. The best 
strategy for external actors is patiently to help improve a socio-economic environment in which 
stakeholders interact among themselves and construct fair and efficient machinery of state. 
The third lesson from the Japanese experience is that democracy is not always a bulwark against 
exclusivist nationalism or ethno/religious xenophobia. Socio-political stress stemming from state-
building, economic development and democratization may induce political forces to resort to these 
negative identities. External players should not be headlong in their promotion of democracy; they 
must act carefully and deliberately to avoid an unhappy marriage between democracy and 
xenophobia. 
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